Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co. - 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910)

I. Issue
Whether D is liable for damages when D moored its ship to P's dock to avoid the storm.
II. Fact
P's vessel lay upon the outside of D's dock, her bow to the east, the wind and waves striking her starboard quarter with such force that she was constantly being lifted and thrown against the dock, resulting in its damage.
III. Holding
Those in charge of the vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts held her in such a position that the damage to the dock resulted, and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, it seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to the extent of the injury inflicted.
This is not a case where life or property was menaced by any object or thing belonging to the P, the destruction of which became necessary to prevent the threatened disaster.  Nor is it a case where, because of the act of God, or unavoidable accident, the infliction of the injury was beyond the control of the D, but is one where the D prudently and advisedly availed itself of the Ps' property for the purpose of preserving its own more valuable property, and the Ps are entitled to compensation for the injury done.

Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont'l Freight, Inc. - 135 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1998)

I. Issue
Whether the court conditions damages on the landowner's notice to the trespasser.
II. Fact
Cavalea Continental Freight bought several parcels and Burns Philp Food the remainder.  As a result, Burns Philp mistakenly paid property taxes on land owned by Cavalea.  Burns Philp sued in restitution to obtain reimbursement for the tax payments.   Cavalea filed a counter claim accusing Burns Philp of building a fence that encroached onto its parcel.
III. Holding
Burns Philp did not seek anyone's consent to build the fence.  It thought that the fence was on its land, and no one knew otherwise until 1995.  Knowledge of a fence's existence is not equivalent to consent.  Cavalea accordingly is entitled to damages.

Motus v. Pfizer Inc. - 196 F. Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1944 (9th Cir.)

I. Issue
Whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment when Plaintiff did not show that the result would have been different if Defendant had warned the doctor of suicidal effect more adequately.
II. Fact
D's medication (Zoloft) was prescribed to treat P's depression.  P committed suicide.  P's wife brought a lawsuit, alleging that D's failure to warn of this risk caused her husband to commit suicide.  D moved for summary judgement which is granted in the trial court.
III. Holding
A plaintiff asserting causes of action based on a failure to warn must prove not only that no warning was provided or the warning was inadequate, but also that the inadequacy or absence of the warning caused the plaintiff's injury.
This court will not apply the rebuttable presumption (had there been an adequate warning, the doctor would have heeded it) since no California court has adopted or applied that presumption.  P has failed to adduce evidence that Dr. Trostler would have acted differently had D provided an adequate warning about the risk of suicide associated with the ingestion of Zoloft.
Dr. Trostler's credibility is not a jury question because there is no equivocal evidence in the record, nor evidence undermining Dr. Trostler's veracity.
In any event, it would appear that P could not demonstrate that D's alleged overpromotion caused Dr. Trostler to prescribe Zoloft to P.
Thus, D is entitled to summary judgment.

Chow v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc. - 950 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 2011)

I. Issue
Whether Defendant's motion for summary judgment may be granted when Defendant is merely stating that RDL (Lewis Red Devil Lye) is dangerous, that everyone knows it is dangerous, and that precise warnings of its danger were given and not followed.
II. Fact
P lost one of his eye when he was using RDL to unclog a drain.  He could not read English, so he could not read the warnings on the product.  P brought this products liability action against D responsible for the manufacture, distribution, and package design of RDL.  D moved for summary judgement.
III. Holding
Summary judgment in a strict products liability case may be granted on the basis of the plaintiffs conduct when the plaintiff's actions constituted "the sole proximate cause" of his or her injuries.  Even, with adequate warnings, a product may be so dangerous, and its misuse may be so foreseeable, that a factfinder employing the required risk-utility analysis our case law has established could reasonably conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing it.  On this motion, merely stating in an attorney's affirmation that RDL is dangerous, that everyone knows it is dangerous, and that precise warnings of its danger were given and not followed was insufficient to entitle defendants to summary judgment as a matter of law.  D were required to demonstrate that RDL was reasonably safe for its intended use, but they offered no such evidence.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. - 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)

I. Issue
Whether Defendant is liable for a defect in its product when there was not enough evidence that the D was negligent or breached any express or implied warranty.
II. Fact
P brought this action against the retailer and the manufacturer of a Shopsmith, a combination power tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe.  After P had worked on the piece of wood several times without difficulty, it suddenly flew out of the machine and struck him on the forehead, inflicting serious injuries.
III. Reasoning
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.  The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.  To establish the manufacturer's liability, it was sufficient that P proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.
IV. Holding
D is strictly liable for the Shopsmith.

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling C. of Fresno - 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)

I. Issue
Whether a manufacturer is liable for a defect in its product under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when there is not enough evidence.
II. Fact
A bottle of Coca Cola broke in P's hand, inflicting a deep cut.  P relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  D contended that the evidence is insufficient.
III. Reasoning
Although it is not clear in this case whether the explosion was caused by an excessive charge or a defect in the glass there in a sufficient showing that neither cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had been used.  Further, D had exclusive control over both the charging and inspection of the bottles.  Accordingly, all the requirements necessary to entitle P to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of negligence present.
IV. Holding
D is liable for the defect.
V. Concurring Opinion
In these cases the course of the manufacturer's liability was his negligence in the manufacturing process or in the inspection of component parts supplied by others.  Even if there is no negligence, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.  An injured person is not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is.  It is to the public interest to prevent injury to the public from any defective goods by the imposition of civil liability generally.  The manufacturer's liability should be defined in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use, and should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to the product as it reached the market.

Pingaro v. Rossi - 731 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999)

Pingaro v. Rossi

731 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999)

I. Issue

Whether a dog bite P suffered from a dog owned by D may constitute strict liability.

II. Reasoning

According to the so-called "dog bite" statute, N.J.S.A. 4:19-16,

The  owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten regardless f the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness.

D was the owner of the dog, the dog bit P and the bite occurred while P was lawfully on D's property.

III. Holding

Satisfaction of the elements of the statute imposes strict liability upon D for damages sustained by P.

Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp. - 810 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1991) (en banc)

Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.

810 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1991) (en banc)

I. Issue

Whether D is strictly liable for damages caused by fireworks displays.

II. Fact

During the fireworks display, one of the 5-inch mortars was knocked into a horizontal position.  From this position an aerial shell inside was ignited and discharged.  The shell flew 500 feet in a trajectory parallel to the earth and exploded near the crowd of onlookers.  P were injured by the explosion.

III. Reasoning

1. Fireworks Displays as Abnormally Dangerous Activities

Section 519 of the Restatement provides that any party carrying on an "abnormally dangerous activity" is strictly liable for ensuing damages.  Section 520 of the Restatement lists six factors that are to be considered in determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous."  Among them, the fireworks displays satisfy (a), (b), (c), and (d): 

(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will great;(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage.

We therefore hold that conducting public fireworks displays is an abnormally dangerous activity justifying the imposition of strict liability.

2. Public Policy and Strict Liability for Fireworks Displays

All evidence was destroyed as to what caused the misfire of the shell that injured P.  Therefore, the problem of proof this case presents for the plaintiffs also supports imposing strict liability on D.

3. Statutory Strict Liability for Fireworks

RCW 70.77.285, which mandates insurance coverage to pay for all damages resulting from fireworks displays, imposes statutory strict liability.  The court in Beeler held that the language of the statute clearly established strict liability for the owner of the dog.  Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the statute as mandating coverage of all damages caused by fireworks displays, regardless of whether those damages were caused by negligence of D.

4. Possible Negligent Manufacture as an Intervening Force

Section 522 of the Restatement provides that:

One carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the unexpectable(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person....

We hold that intervening acts of third persons serve to relieve the D from strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities only if those acts were unforeseeable in relation to the extraordinary risk created by the activity.  In the present case, negligence on the part of the fireworks manufacturer is readily foreseeable in relation to the extraordinary risk created by conducting a public fireworks display.
IV. Holding
We hold that D is strictly liable for all damages suffered as a result of the July 1987 fireworks display.

Ryland v. Fletcher - [1868] All E.R. 1

Ryland v. Fletcher

[1868] All E.R. 1

I. Issue

Whether D is strictly liable when it made a reservoir, by which water passed on into the workings under the close of the P, causing damage.

II. Reasoning

The neighbor who has brought something on his own property (which was not naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property.

III. Holding

In this case, D has strict liability.

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore - 517 U.S. 559 (1996)

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore

517 U.S. 559 (1996)

I. Issue

Whether a $2 million punitive damages award to the purchaser of one of the cars exceeds the constitutional limit.

II. Fact

P bought a car that had been unknowingly repainted from D.  P found the evidence after nine months from the purchase.  D had adopted a nationwide policy in 1983 concerning cars that were damaged in the course of manufacture or transportation.  If the repair cost did not exceed 3 percent of the suggested retail price, the car was sold as new without advising the dealer that any repairs had been made.  To support his claim for punitive damages, P introduced evidence that since 1983 BMW had sold 983 refinished cars as new, without disclosing that the cars had been repainted before sale.

III. Procedure

The jury returned a verdict finding BMW liable for compensatory damages of $4,000 and punitive damages of $4 million, based on a determination that the nondisclosure policy constituted "gross, oppressive or malicious" fraud.  D filed a post-trial motion to set aside the punitive damages award.  The trial judge denied D's post-trial motion, and the Alabama Supreme Court also rejected BMW's claim that the award exceeded the constitutionally permissible amount.  However, the court found that the jury improperly computed the amount of punitive damages by multiplying P's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other jurisdictions.  The court ordered remittitur in $2 million.  

IV. Reasoning

Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a Sate's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.  P argued that the large punitive damages award was necessary to induce BMW to change the nationwide policy, but by attempting to alter BMW's nationwide policy, Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of other States.  The award must be analyzed in the light of conduct that occurred within Alabama, with consideration given only to the interests of Alabama consumers.

Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.  Three guideposts lead us to the conclusion that the $2 million award is grossly excessive: the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by P and his punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.  

V. Holding

The award is grossly excessive.  REVERSED and REMANDED.

Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. - 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003)

Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.

347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003)

I. Issue

Whether P is entitled to receive punitive damage awards and in what amount.

II. Fact

Ps were bitten by bedbugs in D's hotel.  Before the incident, Ecolab, the extermination service that the motel used, recommended that it be hired to spray every room; the motel refused.  

III. Procedure

Ps claim that D was guilty of "willful and wanton conduct" and is liable for punitive as well as compensatory damages.  P won.  D appeals, complaining primarily about the punitive damages award.  

IV. Reasoning

D's failure either to warn guests or to take effective measures to eliminate the bedbugs amounted to fraud and probably to battery as well.  There was sufficient evidence of "willful and wanton conduct" within the meaning that the Illinois courts assign to the term to permit an award of punitive damages in this case.

Punitive damages should be proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant's actions.  D should have reasonable notice of the sanction for unlawful acts, so that he can make a rational determination of how to act; and so there have to be reasonably clear standards for determining the amount of punitive damages for particular wrongs.  Sanctions should be based on the wrong done rather than on the status of the D; a person is punished for what he does, not for who he is, even if the who is a huge corporation.  The award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the additional purpose of limiting the D's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and private prosecution.  D's net worth of $1.6 billion becomes relevant when we consider Ps might have had difficulty financing this lawsuit.

V. Holding

P is entitled to receive punitive damage awards, and the amount from the jury is was not excessive.  AFFIRMED.

National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co. - 731 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1987)

National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co. 

731 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1987)

I. Issue

Whether an award of punitive damages should be upheld.

II. Fact

Foley smashed into the rear of the car of McGee (M) and Staggs (S), causing it to hit the house and trailer, and then to hit two bystanders.  S and M died.  The estates (P) of S and M filed wrongful death actions against D (Foley, National By-Products, Inc., and the moving company).  Foley exceeded the speed limit and got extremely close to another car.  His car might have had a broken brakes.  Ryder Truck Company checks truck brakes 8,000 miles.

III. Procedure

D filed cross-complaints against each other, each asking compensatory and punitive damages from the other.  Compensatory damage awards and punitive damage awards are given to each estate and to the moving company.  The moving company agreed to a remittitur of its compensatory damage award.  The damage award involved this appeal is the $100,000 punitive damage award made in favor of appellee moving company and against National By-Products, Inc. 

IV. Reasoning

An award of punitive damages is justified only where the evidence indicates that the D acted wantonly in causing the injury or with such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred. 

V. Holding

In the case at bar there was proof of gross negligence, but gross negligence is not sufficient to justify punitive damages.  The facts do not show that appellant intentionally acted in such a way that the natural and probable consequence was to damage appellee's property.  Nor do the facts show that appellant knew that some act of negligence was about to cause damage, but still continued to cause that damage.  We hold that there was no substantial evidence to support the award of punitive damages and reverse the judgment.

Dissenting

The majority's opinion has examined the evidence supporting punitive damages more from the appellant's standpoint than the appellee's.  When viewed most favorably to the appellee, and with its fullest probative force, I believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's refusal to grant a motion for a directed verdict.

Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp. - 693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1985)

Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp.

693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1985)

I. Issue

1) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning events at the hotel.

2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to exclude the testimonies of two law school professors and the economist.

3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a remittitur of $2,000,000 since the jury's verdict greatly exceeded the upper limits of "fair and reasonable compensation."

II. Fact

Two skywalks collapsed onto the hotel's crowded lobby floor.  Victims and their family members sued various defendants, including Hyatt.  Some victims agreed not to present evidence bearing on how the defendants constructed and maintained the skywalks in exchange for settlement.  

III. Procedure

The trial of Kenton resulted in a  jury award of $4 million in compensatory damages.  D filed post-verdict motions seeking a new trial on the ground that the jury's award was excessive.  The trial judge concluded that the verdict was excessive and entered an order sustaining a motion for a new trial unless P filed a remittitur (remission) of $250,000.  P accepted the remittitur.  Both appealed.

The Court of Appeals declined to restore the remittitur.

IV. Reasoning

1) P was entitled to show the force and violence of this tragic occurrence as bearing upon the nature of her injuries.  Even though photographs are gruesome, they need not be excluded if they satisfy the rules as to the admission of demonstrative evidence.  The evidence's probative value far outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have had on the jury.

2) There was a sufficient factual basis for them to give their opinions.  Her slight experience with para-and quadriplegics did not affect her expertise on employment opportunities.  The economists' expert testimony can be based upon the expert testimony of the employment counselor. 

3) The ultimate test is what fairly and reasonably compensates plaintiff for the injuries sustained.  In making this determination consideration is given to the nature and extent to the injuries, diminished earning capacity, economic conditions, plaintiff's age, and a comparison of the compensation awarded and permitted in cases of comparable injuries.

V. Holding

1) There was no error in admitting the evidence.

2) There was no error in admitting the testimonies of the law school professors and economist.

3) The verdict of the jury is affirmed and the cause is remanded with directions to set aside the order of remittitur and to reinstate the verdict and enter judgment for P in the sum of $4,000,000.