Hawkins v. Masters Farms, Inc. - 2003 WL 21555767 (D. Kan. 2003)

I. Issue
Whether Mr. Creal was a citizen of the State of Kansas or the State of Missouri at the time of his death.
II. Fact
Plaintiffs representing the Estate of James Patrick Creal brought this action arising from a December 8, 2000 traffic accident in which a tractor driven by Defendant collided with Mr. Creal's automobile, resulting in the death of Mr. Creal.  Plaintiffs filed this action in federal court alleging the existence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332.
IV. Holding
1. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Standard
A court reviewing a factual attack may not presume that the plaintiff's allegations are true.  Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the jurisdiction is proper.
2. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A person is a "citizen" of the state in which he or she is "domiciled."  For adults, domicile is established by physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there.  Mr. Creal had not only established a physical presence in the State of Kansas, but also displayed an intent to remain there.  He was a citizen of the State of Kansas at the time of his death.  Because Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that complete diversity exists among the parties, the court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

United States v. Beggerly - 524 U.S. 38 (1998)

I Issue
Whether P's complaint meets the language of FRCP 60.
II. Fact
In 1979, the federal government brought a title action against Beggerly.  They settled.  Judgment was entered based on this settlement agreement.  In 1994, armed with new information, Beggerly sued to obtain a damage award for the disputed land.  The District Court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to hear D's suit and dismissed the complaint.  The court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the suit satisfied the elements of an "independent action," as the term is used in FRCP 60(b).
III. Holding
The sense of these expressions is that an independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.  In this case, it should be obvious that P's allegations do not nearly approach the demanding standing.  P alleges only that the United States failed to "thoroughly search its records and make full disclosure to the Court."  There was a insufficient basis to justify the reopening of the judgment in the previous litigation.

Kovach v. District of Columbia - 805 A.2d 957 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002)

I. Issue
Whether the earlier proceeding is the essential equivalent of a judicial proceeding when P sued D after paying traffic fines.
II Fact
The District dismissed outstanding fines assessed to some motorists whose infractions were recorded by the H Street bridge camera, but determined that those who had already paid the tickets would not be reimbursed.  P claimed that the District's decision to forgive some fines and enforce others of "similarly situated" motorists who were "unfairly and confusingly" entrapped by the camera was facially discriminatory and violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
III. Reasoning
Given P's admission of liability, collateral estoppel precludes appellant from challenging the District's decision as discriminatory as applied to him.  Even where res judicata is inapplicable, collateral estoppel may bar relitigation of the issues determined in a prior action.  Collateral estoppel restricts a party in certain circumstances from relitigating issues or facts actually litigated and necessarily decided in an earlier proceeding.  This principle applies not only to judicial adjudications, but also to determinations made by agencies other than courts, when such agencies are acting in a judicial capacity.
IV. Holding
The earlier proceeding is a judicial proceeding when P sued D after paying traffic fines.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components - 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976)

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components

275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976)

I. Issue

Whether D may be collaterally estopped from contesting liability in each of the 48 actions, where the actions were consolidated for a single hearing in the court below on the issue of collateral estoppel.

II. Fact

D constructed prefabricated housing in a large shed.  The fire spear via the loading dock and caused substantial damage to D's shed, the warehouse, in which P's property was stored.

III. Procedure

Some judgment were made for D and affirmed, and some for P.

IV. Reasoning

Where there are extant determinations that are inconsistent on the matter in issue, it is a strong indication that the application of collateral estoppel would work an injustice.  We do not give much weight to variations to the wording of the pleadings, where essentially the same acts and omissions are alleged.

V. Holding

The prior determinations are basically inconsistent and that the circumstances are such that it would be unfair to preclude defendants from relitigating the issue of liability.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore - 439 U.S. 322 (1979)

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore

439 U.S. 322 (1979)

I. Issue

Whether a party who has had issues of fact adjudicated adversely to it in an equitable action may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new party.

II. Fact

The respondent brought this stockholder's class action against the petitioners in a Federal District Court.  The complaint alleged that the petitioners, Parklane Hosiery Co., et al. had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger.  Before this action came to trial, the SEC filed suit against the same Ds in the Federal District Court, alleging that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent's complaint.  The District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged.  The court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this judgment.

The respondent in the present case then moved for partial summary judgment against the petitioners, asserting that the petitioners were collaterally estopped from litigating the issues that had been resolved against them in the action brought by the SEC.

III. Reasoning

In cases where a P could easily have joined in the earlier action or where the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a D, trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.  In the present case, the application of offensive collateral estoppel will not reward a private P who could have joined in the previous action, since the respondent probably could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the SEC.  Also, there is no unfairness to the petitioners in applying offensive collateral estoppel in this case.  None of the considerations that would justify a refusal to allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel is present in this case.  Furthermore, if the law of collateral estoppel forecloses the petitioners from relitigating the factual issues determined against them in the SEC action, nothing in the Seventh Amendment dictates a different result   The Seventh Amendment is not a bar to successful assertion of issue preclusion.

IV. Holding

A party who has had issues of fact adjudicated adversely to it in an equitable action my be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new party.

Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Parks - 181 Ind. App. 141, 390 N.E.2d 1078 (1979)

Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Parks

181 Ind. App. 141, 390 N.E.2d 1078 (1979)

I. Issue

Whether Jessie's claim is barred by claim preclusion and whether the prior action precludes Jessie on the issue of contributory negligence when he sought damages for loss of Bertha's services and consortium in the previous suit.

II. Fact

Jessie and Bertha Parks were injured when their car collided with an Illinois Central train.  They sued Illinois Central;  Bertha sought compensation for her injuries, and Jessie sought damages for loss of Bertha's services and consortium.  Bertha received a $30,000 judgment on her claim, and judgment was rendered for Illinois Central on Jessie's claim.

Jessie sued Illinois Central for his own injuries.  In summary judgment, the trial court held that Jessie's claim was not barred by claim preclusion and that the prior action did not preclude Jessie on the issue of contributory negligence.  Illinois Central took an interlocutory appeal.

III. Reasoning

Jessie's cause of action is a different cause of action from the one he litigated in the companion case; therefore estoppel by judgment (claim preclusion) does not apply.  However, estoppel by verdict (issue preclusion) does apply.  D has failed its burden of showing that the judgment against Jessie in the prior action could not have been rendered without deciding that Jessie was contributorily negligent in the accident which precipitated the two lawsuits.

IV. Holding

The trial court was correct in granting partial summary judgment estopping the railroad from denying its negligence and in limiting the issues at trial to whether Jessie was contributorily negligent, whether any such contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and whether Jessie sustained personal injuries and compensable damages.

Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith - 918 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1990)

Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith

918 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1990)

I. Issue

1) Whether a federal court must apply federal or state claim preclusion law in deciding 2) whether a prior state court judgment upon subject matter over which only a federal court has jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent federal court claim upon the identical cause of action.

II. Fact

The brokerage firm filed suit for collection.  In response, Gargallo filed an answer and counter claim against Merrill Lynch, alleging that Merrill Lynch had violated federal securities laws.  The state court dismissed Gargallo's counterclaim with prejudice. citing Ohio Civil Rule 37 (substantially identical to Federal Rule 37), for refusal to comply with Merrill Lynch's discovery requests and the court's discovery orders.  Gargallo then filed a complaint in the United States District Court charging Merrill Lynch and its account executive with violating federal securities laws based on the same transactions at issue in the state litigation.  The district court dismissed the suit on res judicata grounds, finding that the issues, facts and evidence to sustain this action are identical to the claims asserted against the brokerage firm in the counterclaim that was dismissed with prejudice by the state court.  Gargallo appealed.

III. Holding

The issues, facts, and evidence to sustain this action are identical to the claims asserted in P's state counterclaim.  The federal claim or cause of action giving rise to this appeal is the same claim or cause of action that was asserted in the counterclaim dismissed in the sate court litigation.  Thus, Ohio claim preclusion law would bar the claim asserted in P's district court complaint had it been filed in an Ohio court.

However, federal securities laws are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Thus, Ohio court judgment may not be given claim preclusive effect in a subsequent federal court action asserting those same claims because Ohio courts would not give claim preclusive effect to a prior final judgment upon a cause of action over which the Ohio court had no subject matter jurisdiction.

Taylor v. Sturgell - 553 U.S. 880 (2008)

Taylor v. Sturgell

553 U.S. 880 (2008)

I. Issue

Whether there is a "virtual representation" exception to the general rule against precluding nonparties. 

II. Fact

The courts below held the instant FOIA (The Freedom of Information Act) suit barred by the judgment in earlier litigation seeking the same records.  The first suit was filed by Greg Herrick.  He filed a FOIA request asking the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for copies of any technical documents about the F-45 contained in the agency's records.  The FAA denied his request upon finding that the documents are confidential according to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4).  The District Court granted summary judgment to the FAA.  The Tenth Circuit affirmed.  Brent Taylor, a friend of Herrick's, submitted a FOIA request seeking the same documents Herrick sued to obtain.  When the FAA failed to respond, Taylor filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  Taylor raised two issues that Herrick had failed to raise in his appeal.  The District Court concluded that Taylor's suit was barred by claim preclusion; it granted summary judgment to Fairchild and the FAA, reasoning that both of the necessary conditions for virtual representation met.

III. Reasoning
A litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party.  Nonparty preclusion has the limitations based on adequate representation.  Stare decisis will allow courts swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in the same circuit.  The human tendency not to waste money will deter the bringing of suits based on claims or issues that have already been adversely determined against others.  Taylor is not Herrick's legal representative and he has not purported to sue in a representative capacity.  However, preclusion would be appropriate if respondents could demonstrate that he is acting as Herrick's undisclosed agent.

IV. Holding

We remand to give the courts below an opportunity to determine whether Taylor, in pursuing the instant FOIA suit, is acting as Herrick's agent.

Searle Brothers v. Searle - 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978)

Searle Brothers v. Searle

588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978)

I. Issue

Whether sons of a party who had a divorce lawsuit against another party are barred from bringing a new trial against the identical party by claim and issue preclusion.

II. Fact

Edlean Searle sued Woodey Searle for a divorce.  Woodey argued that he had a one-half interest in the Slaugh House and that the other half was owned by a partnership with his sons as partners.  In that case, the court awarded the Slaugh House to Edlean to even out the distribution of marital property.  This action was brought against Edlean by the partnership.  

III. Procedure

The trial court held that claim and issue preclusion barred this action.  Appellants appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in that the appellants were not parties to the divorce action and could not be bound by the decree entered therein.

IV. Rule

The California Supreme Court considered the question of the applicability of res judicata as a basis for applying the collateral estoppel doctrine and identified the following four tests as being determinative:

1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?

2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?

4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and fairly litigated?

V. Holding

Appellants' interest was neither mutual nor successive.  They claim their own, independent and separate partnership interest of the property involved.  The rights are similar but not identical.  The partnership interest was not legally represented in the prior divorce suit.

Appellants cannot be bound by the decree entered in the previous suit nor are they estopped from litigating their own claim against the property in a subsequent suit since they were not parties or privies in the first action, and the issue raised in the second action was never litigated in the prior proceeding. 

Frier v. City of Vandalia - (770 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1985)

Frier v. City of Vandalia

(770 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1985)

I. Issue

Whether it makes a difference that two of the replevin actions went to judgment, while P challenges the towing of four cars, based on the same fact.

II. Fact

The police called a local garage, which towed four of Frier's cars parked in a narrow street.  Frier balked at paying the fee.  P filed suits in the courts of Illinois seeking replevin against The City of Vandalia and the garage that had towed the car.  One of the suits  was dismissed voluntarily when P got his cars back.  The other two cased were consolidated and litigated.  The court concluded for D.  After losing in state court, P turned to federal court, maintaining that the City had not offered him a hearing either before or after it took the cars, violating the "official policy."  The complaint invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983, and it sought equitable relief.  The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

III. Rule

One suit precludes a second where the parties and the cause of action are identical.  

Claim preclusion is designed to impel parties to consolidate all closely related matters into one suit.

IV. Reasoning

Some cases in Illinois recognize preclusion when both suits arise out of the same transaction.  This ground of preclusion is potentially broader than the "same evidence" ground.  P could have urged constitutional grounds as reasons for replevin.  

V. Holding

The City is entitled to prevail on the ground of claim preclusion, although the district court did not decide the case on that ground.  If P had filed the current suit in state court, he would have lost under the doctrine of claim preclusion.  Under 28 U.S.C. §1738 he therefore loses in federal court as well.  AFFIRMED.

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader - 102 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1939)

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader

102 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1939)

I. Issue
Can a party appeal from an order made under FRCP 34 for the discovery and production of documents.

II. Fact
D in an action for treble damages have appealed from an order of the trial court made under FRCP 34 for the discovery and production of documents.

III. Holding
An order of this nature is interlocutory, and, therefore, not appealable.  Appeal dismissed.

Peterson v. Wilson - 141 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 1998)

Peterson v. Wilson

141 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 1998)

I. Issue
Did the district court err by granting a new trial simply because the court would have come to a different conclusion than the jury did?

II. Fact
The district court met with and interrogated the jurors outside the presence of the parties and their respective counsel, and then proceeded to act in direct reliance on the jurors' comments as though they constituted newly discovered evidence of a kind that the court properly consider.

III. Procedure
Peterson filed this suit, arguing that his property interest in his employment at TSU was damaged.  The jury found for P.  D renewed his motion for j.m.l. and added his alternative motion for new trial.  The district court granted the new trial on its own motion, reasoning that the jury completely disregarded the Court's instructions.  P filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court rejected.  The case was re-tried and ended in a jury verdict in favor of D.

IV. Holding
Receiving testimony from the jurors after they have returned their verdict, for the purpose of ascertaining that the jury misunderstood its instructions, is prohibited by F.R.E. 606(b).  We reverse the district court's grant of a new trial, vacate the court's judgment rendered on the basis of the jury verdict in the second trial, and reinstate the results of the first trial.

Lind v. Schenley Industries - 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960)

Lind v. Schenley Industries

278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960)

I. Issue
Whether the trial court erred in granting the j.n.o.v. an a new trial.

II. Fact
P, Lind, alleged that D orally promised him an increase but then breached  that promise.  His then-secretary testified for P.  D's agents denied making the promises.

III Procedure
The jury found a contract; a damage award followed.  D moved both for j.n.o.v. and, alternatively, for a new trial.  The trial judge granted the j.n.o.v., and, in the alternative, a new trial.  P appealed.

IV. Reasoning
It if frequently stated that a motion for a new trial on certain ground ordinarily is non-reviewable because within the discretion of the trial court.  But this discretion must be exercised in accordance with ascertainable legal standards and if an appellate court is shown unusual circumstances which clearly indicate an abuse of discretion in that the trial court failed to apply correctly the proper standards, reversal is possible.

V. Holding
We conclude that the jury did believed the secretary's testimony and that the court below substituted its judgment for that of the jury on this issue and thereby abused its legal discretion.  Reversed and remanded.

Pennsylvania Railroad v. Chamberlain - 288 U.S. 333 (1933)

Pennsylvania Railroad v. Chamberlain

288 U.S. 333 (1933)

I. Issue

Whether Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted.

II. Fact
This is an action brought by respondent (P) against petitioner (D) to recover for the death of a brakeman, alleged to have been caused by petitioner's negligence.  The cars ridden by deceased had passed to track 14, his body was found on that track some distance beyond the switch.  He had fallen onto the track and been run over by a car.  Three employees testified that no violent collision occurred, by which P claims the fall of deceased was caused.  Only one witness,  Bainbridge, testified for P.  

III. Procedure
The trial court directed the jury to find a verdict in favor of petitioner (D).  The court of appeals reversed the verdict for P.

IV. Reasoning
There is no conflict in the testimony as to the facts.  Bainbridge said that he heard a "loud crash" but did not said there was a collision.  The desired inference is precluded for the further reason that respondent's right of recovery depends upon the existence of a particular fact which must be inferred from proven facts, and this is not permissible in the face of the positive and otherwise uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses consistent with the facts actually proved, from which testimony it affirmatively appears that the fact sought to be inferred did not exist.

V. Holding
D's motion should be granted.  We have a case belonging to that class of cases where proven facts give equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences; in which event, neither of them being established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these inferences as against the other, before he is entitled to recover.