National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co. - 731 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1987)

National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co. 

731 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1987)

I. Issue

Whether an award of punitive damages should be upheld.

II. Fact

Foley smashed into the rear of the car of McGee (M) and Staggs (S), causing it to hit the house and trailer, and then to hit two bystanders.  S and M died.  The estates (P) of S and M filed wrongful death actions against D (Foley, National By-Products, Inc., and the moving company).  Foley exceeded the speed limit and got extremely close to another car.  His car might have had a broken brakes.  Ryder Truck Company checks truck brakes 8,000 miles.

III. Procedure

D filed cross-complaints against each other, each asking compensatory and punitive damages from the other.  Compensatory damage awards and punitive damage awards are given to each estate and to the moving company.  The moving company agreed to a remittitur of its compensatory damage award.  The damage award involved this appeal is the $100,000 punitive damage award made in favor of appellee moving company and against National By-Products, Inc. 

IV. Reasoning

An award of punitive damages is justified only where the evidence indicates that the D acted wantonly in causing the injury or with such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred. 

V. Holding

In the case at bar there was proof of gross negligence, but gross negligence is not sufficient to justify punitive damages.  The facts do not show that appellant intentionally acted in such a way that the natural and probable consequence was to damage appellee's property.  Nor do the facts show that appellant knew that some act of negligence was about to cause damage, but still continued to cause that damage.  We hold that there was no substantial evidence to support the award of punitive damages and reverse the judgment.

Dissenting

The majority's opinion has examined the evidence supporting punitive damages more from the appellant's standpoint than the appellee's.  When viewed most favorably to the appellee, and with its fullest probative force, I believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's refusal to grant a motion for a directed verdict.